DOCUMENT RESUME

ED 149 000 UD 017 894

AUTHOR	Schmandt, Henry J.; And Others
TITLE	Government, Politics and the Public Schools; A Preliminary Study of Three Cities.
INSTITUTION	Saint Louis Univ., Mo. Center for Urban Programs.
SPONS AGENCY	Danforth Foundation, St. Louis, Mo.
PUB DATE	2 Sep 77
NOTE	99p.
EDRS PRICE	MF-$0.83 HC-$4.67 Plus Postage.
DESCRIPTORS	Bus Transportation; Case Studies; City Government; Consolidated Schools; Elementary Secondary Education; *Governmental Structure; *Government School Relationship; *Metropolitan Areas; *Political Influences; Public School Systems; School Demography; *School Integration; *School Organization
IDENTIFIERS	Indiana (Indianapolis); Kentucky (Louisville); Missouri (Saint Louis); Tennessee (Nashville)

ABSTRACT

This is a preliminary study of the relationship of local government reorganization to the operation of the public school system in each of three urban complexes. Included in the study were two of the approximately twenty metropolitan areas in the U.S. and Canada that have undergone governmental merger or major structural reorganization since 1946: Nashville/Davidson County and Indianapolis/Marion County. A third area, Louisville/Jefferson County, where school district consolidation but no merger of municipal and county governments has taken place, was also included. In addition to the significant reorganization all three areas have undergone, each of the areas has been involved in long and costly litigation over the school desegregation issue. In this document, the results of the examination are presented in the form of three case studies. These studies, in turn, are followed by an overall impression and evaluation of the findings, and a number of generalizations of probable application to a broader spectrum of cities. Finally, the preliminary findings of the study are related to the school system/government situation in St. Louis, with appropriate parallels drawn. (Author/GC)

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GOVERNMENT, POLITICS, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF THREE CITIES

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September 2, 1977

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A Study Conducted Under a Grant from
The Danforth Foundation of St. Louis, Missouri

UD017894

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THREE CITIES STUDY

The Center for Urban Programs, under a grant from the Danforth Foundation, has conducted a preliminary study of the relationship of local government reorganization to the operation of the public school systems in three urban complexes. The study includes two of the approximately twenty metropolitan areas in the United States and Canada that have undergone governmental merger or major structural reorganization since 1946*: Nashville-Davidson county and Indianapolis-Marion county. A third area--Louisville-Jefferson county--where school district consolidation but no merger of the municipal and county governments has taken place, was also included.

These three urban areas were chosen for examination primarily because they represent three different governmental structural arrangements while at the same time being similar enough in demographic and socio-economic characteristics to permit some generalization as to the relationship of

*cf J.C. Bollens and H.J. Schmandt, The Metropolis, Third Edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1975), pp 237-329.

governmental form to the delivery of public education. In Nashville-Davidson county, both the city and county governments along with the school districts have been consolidated into a single entity; in Indianapolis-Marion county, major governmental restructuring has taken place but the school districts have been left untouched; and in Louisville-Jefferson county, only the school districts have been consolidated while no basic reorganization of the city and county governments has occured. These structural changes, moreover, have been accomplished by three different routes: by vote of the residents (Nashville); by action of the state legislature (Indianapolis); and by the state department of education on petition of the central city school board (Louisville).

The results of this preliminary examination are presented in the form of case studies, one for each of the urban areas involved. These studies, in turn, are followed by an overall impression and evaluation of the findings and the drawing of a number of generalizations of probable application to a broader spectrum of cities. In conducting the research, site visits of approximately three days were made to each of the three cities by two faculty members from the Center for Urban Programs at Saint Louis University. These visits involved interviews with knowledgeable citizens, general government officials, school board members and administrators, and local researchers. Before embarking upon the site visits, staff at the Center assembled and analyzed background information and bibliographic material on each of the three cities. Professors Henry J. Schmandt and George D. Wendel and Senior Research Associate John T. Manns of the Center for Urban Programs were principal investigators for the project.

We wish to emphasize that because of the exploratory nature of the study and the limited resources available to us, the findings are preliminary and tentative. They are, nevertheless, provocative and warrant testing in additional cities. Because of their timeliness to such matters of local concern as governmental restructuring, school desegregation, and involvement of the business leadership in community affairs, the concluding chapter of this study makes brief references to the St. Louis situation. In this connection, we hope to refine and expand our analysis by research in a larger sample of cities and to explore in a more systematic fashion the relevance of the findings to public policymaking in the St. Louis complex.

The tentative propositions derived from our study of the three urban areas may be summarized as follows:

--Despite the many failures to achieve broad-scale reorganization in the nation's SMSAs, significant alterations in the local governmental system of many urban areas have been brought about over the past several decades.

--The government of the central county is emerging as the dominant political unit in many SMSAs.

--The kind of informal relationships that exist between a state and its principal urban areas is one of the determinative factors of governmental change in such communities.

--Broad-scale reorganization of local government in an urban area is unlikely to take place unless espoused and promoted by a key political figure in the metropolitan community.

--A racially-mixed community cannot seriously cope with the problem of quality education until it has first resolved the desegregation issue.

--Dissatisfaction with the public school system and a lack of confidence in those who administer it are today common characteristics of many large and medium-size cities.

--In SMSAs with a large minority population, a school desegregation plan based on racial proportions can be made operational only within an area larger than the central city.

--An increasing number of blacks are evidencing more concern for the quality of education and less interest in the racial mix ordered by the courts.

--Courts are likely to approve desegregation plans that have been worked out by community leaders, including minority group representatives, even if such plans are not based on strict racial quotas in the schools.

--Solution of the school desegregation issue has been left, in the main, to the courts and to secondary and lower level groups in the community leadership structure.

--The involvement of business leaders in public education may be conceptualized at two levels; technical assistance and issue resolution. Only in the case of the first has there been more than token involvement.

--Like the business elite, local political leaders have tended to avoid involvement in school affairs and issues.

INDIANAPOLIS

The consolidated city of Indianapolis (which includes all of Marion County except four small municipalities) has a population of approximately 715,000. Part of an eight-county SMSA of 1.2 million people, the city serves as one of the Midwest's major trade and manufacturing centers. Its economic base is diversified with over one-fourth of the labor force employed in industries connected with the automotive and transportation fields and another one-seventh in local, state, and federal government agencies. Like other large cities in the Northeast and Midwest, Indianapolis has suffered a population loss in recent years, although to a lesser extent (two percent since 1970) than most. The surrounding counties, on the other hand, have

shown gains. Many of the community's businessmen and public officials tend to attribute this loss to "white flight" precipitated by the school integration issue, but no empirical evidence to substantiate this view is at hand.

In 1969 the Indiana legislature passed the Unified Government Act which provided for consolidation of the governments of the city of Indianapolis and Marion County. The old city of Indianapolis at that time contained about 60 percent of the county's total population and covered an area of 82 square miles. As a result of the merger Indianapolis more than quadrupled its territorial size and became the nation's eleventh largest city in population (previously it ranked 26th).

The black population within the consolidated city totaled nearly 135,000 in 1970, an increase of 37 percent since 1960. Most blacks are concentrated within the old city limits although a significant movement of middle-class black families to the northern tier of adjacent townships is now taking place. This trend is reflected in the school enrollment figures. Within the Indianapolis public school system (which is largely coterminous with the old city boundaries) black enrollment peaked in 1971 at 38,542, and by 1976 had declined almost four percent. The white enrollment dropped nearly one-third during this same period to approximately 50,000. In 1970 white students constituted 65 percent of the school enrollment; today the proportion is less than 55 percent.

In the adjacent school district of Washington Township directly to the north of the old city the number of black pupils jumped from 884 in 1968-69 to 2292 in 1976-77 and now comprise seventeen percent of the total enrollment. Similarly, in Pike Township to the northwest, the number of black students increased during the same period from 112 to 633, or from four percent of the total enrollment to seventeen percent. The Lawrence Township system to the northeast also experienced an influx of black pupils. In 1968-69 it had 42 black students; by 1976-77 this figure had risen to 530, representing six percent of the total enrollment. All three of these suburban townships are middle or upper-middle-class. Washington, for example, enjoys the highest median family income in the state.

Few blacks families reside in any of the other suburban districts within or outside Marion County. This is particularly true of the working-class or blue collar communities. In one such system there are only 16 blacks out of a total enrollment of 4500, and in another 3 out of 2600.

Governmental Reorganization

In 1968, Republicans captured the office of mayor in the city of Indianapolis for only the third time in forty years. The new chief executive was Richard Lugar, a young Indianapolis businessman with strong political ambitions. After taking office, Lugar found himself confronted by a system in which responsibility for many of the vital service and

development functions was divided between city and county agencies or vested in boards over which he had only partial appointing authority. Influenced by the examples of Nashville and Jacksonville (Florida) where city-county consolidation had taken place, he quickly began to explore the possibility of governmental reorganization in Marion County. His interest was encouraged by leaders of the business community who, in traditional fashion, were receptive to efforts to make local government more efficient and economical. It was also viewed favorably by Republican politicians who saw in reorganization the opportunity to extend and consolidate their party's prospects for retaining control over the government of the capital city.

Several months after his induction, Lugar assembled a small group of leading businessmen and Republican functionaries to consider the possibility of reforming the governmental system of the city and county. Some time after the group began meeting, Lugar asked Lewis Bose, a prominent Indianapolis attorney with considerable experience in legislative drafting, to serve as coordinator of a legal task force to prepare legislation reflecting the discussions that were taking place. The strategy agreed upon by the group was to formulate a reorganization plan for enactment by the state legislature, thus avoiding any local referendum. The political situation appeared opportune for this approach. Both the city and county governments were already under Republican control as a result of the 1967 local elections. Now Republican victories at

the state level in the November 1968 elections meant that there would be a Republican governor, strong Republican majorities in both houses of the General Assembly, and a Marion County legislative delegation composed wholly of Republicans.

Following the election Lugar and his group moved rapidly since the biennial session of the General Assembly was scheduled to convene in January 1969 for a period of only 61 days. To broaden the basis of local support the original group of discussants was expanded into the Mayor's Task Force on Improved Governmental Structure, with some fifty prominent citizens drawn from various sectors of the community. Up to this time there had been no public discussion of reorganization since sessions of the original group had taken place quietly behind closed doors. After only three meetings the task force issued its proposal, christened "Unigov", which in substance simply represented the work that had already been done by the predecessor group. A bill embodying the proposal was introduced in the General Assembly and enacted into law in slightly more than two months time. Democratic party leaders, some conservative Republicans, and officials of the small municipalities generally opposed the measure. So did Indianapolis blacks who felt that consolidation with the overwhelmingly white suburbs would dilute their growing political strength in the central city. The opposition, however, was poorly organized (a situation not helped by the rapidity with which the proposal moved) while proponents were not only well organized but

they also had the political muscle (and were willing to use it) to accomplish their objective.

Upon its passage, Unigov immediately attracted national attention as one of the few successful efforts at metropolitan governmental reform in this country. The term "Unigov", however, does not reflect the true nature of the reorganization since a wide and complex variety of governmental units and agencies remain in Marion County. These include 11 school districts, 18 municipalities, and 9 township governments (the townships administer "poor relief" or general assistance and tax assessment, the latter under the supervision of the county assessor). The elective county offices of sheriff, prosecutor, auditor, treasurer, coroner, and assessor continue to operate as before, as do all the city and county courts, the Marion County Welfare Department, and the library system. Health and Hospitals and the Airport Authority remain independent although their budgets are subject to review by the city-county council.

The complicated character of Unigov defies simple description. The compromises and concessions which were made to reduce opposition from various sources and to sidestep state constitutional barriers greatly reduced the integrative thrust of the reorganization and added to the intricate arrangements of the new system. Basically, Unigov effected an administrative integration of the two major political units in Marion County: the city of Indianapolis and the county government. It made no significant change in the service delivery system or its supporting tax

structure. Existing arrangements relative to the territorial extent of the various governmental functions were retained with only minor modifications. Services which were already administered county-wide, such as health and hospitals, parks, zoning, and airports, were continued on this basis under the new government. Those, such as police, fire, and sanitation, which were administered by the individual municipalities or special districts in areas smaller than the county were similarly left unchanged. It should be noted that the Indianapolis area over the years had achieved a substantial degree of functional consolidation, the result of action by the state legislature. This is evidenced by the separate laws enacted prior to Unigov which placed such activities as land use control and public health under agencies with county-wide jurisdiction.

Unigov left the 17 suburban municipalities within Marion County intact. Residents of these communities continue to elect their own local officials as well as vote for the mayor and council of the consolidated city. Four of the municipalities, those with populations of over 5000 are excluded from the territorial jurisdiction of Unigov. As part of the county, however, they are subject to the actions of the council when it serves in its capacity as governing body of the entire county. The "included" municipalities differ from those excluded only in that they are technically subject to some restrictions (they must receive approval from the city-county council for bond issues and their ordinances cannot

be in conflict with or contain lower standards than those of the enlarged city), and they receive services and pay taxes applicable to the whole area encompassed by Unigov. To date, the only employment of the latter provision has been the levying of a small tax for urban renewal purposes.

Tax and service differentials continue to exist throughout Marion County as they did previously. The widespread use of special districts enables the cost of services to be assessed to the particular geographical areas where they are provided. By retaining the existing service districts in the outlying areas and creating two new districts--police and fire--within the old city to keep these costly functions from being financed out of general county revenues, Unigov avoided the issue of equalizing municipal-type services and sharing the county's public resource base according to need. Through the district device, in other words, the wealthier sections are able to avoid subsidizing the service needs of the poorer areas.

The chief executive of the consolidated city is the mayor, chosen by voters of the county in a partisan election. The governing council, also elected on partisan ballots, is composed of 29 members, four of whom are selected at large and the others by district. All councilmen take part in decisions relating to the county as a whole; but in matters affecting an individual service district, participation is limited to those members elected from that area. The question of whether the four elected-at-large

members can vote on service district matters is now before the courts. The issue is a politically sensitive one, particularly with respect to the police and fire districts within the old city. The boundaries of these two districts are essentially coterminous with those of the former central city. If voting on matters relating to these two key functions in the heart of the county is limited to the members elected from the districts within this area, the Democrats are in an advantageous position (since their strength lies in the inner city) to achieve majority control over the services. If, on the other hand, the four members elected at large (who normally are Republicans) are eligible to participate, the scales would be tipped in favor of the Republicans.

The most significant changes brought about by the reorganization relate to administrative structure. Unigov combined a large number of departments and agencies separately administered by the former city and county governments into six executive departments under the mayor. It did not enlarge their territorial jurisdiction or functional authority; it simply made it possible for existing powers to be executed more efficiently and effectively. The new Department of Transportation, for example, took over functions previously exercised by the county highway department, city street department, park board, and mass transportation agency.

Unigov, in the opinion of those we interviewed, has brought about no major change in the way the Indianapolis area is governed. Services are provided by essentially the same agencies as before and paid for in

the same way. No unit of local government has been abolished and no elective office (other than that of county commissioner) eliminated. There is general consensus, however, that the administrative reforms have proved useful and worthwhile. Knowledgeable observers say that the new system has introduced more professional and efficient management practices, brought about greater coordination among--and more unified control over--various independent and semi-autonomous boards and agencies, and effected some economies, such as the consolidation of the city and county purchasing departments. They also agree that Unigov has enhanced the potential for political leadership by establishing the elected office of mayor or chief executive of the consolidated city and county. The holder of this office is the political major-domo of the area with no competing position of similar status and with authority to speak for a county-wide constituency. Observers feel, however, that this potential for leadership has not as yet been realized.

Unigov is now well established. It experienced far fewer political or legal attacks during the first years of its existence than the city-county consolidations of Nashville or Jacksonville or the earlier reorganization of Miami-Dade County. Business leaders and civic groups are generally content with the administrative reorganization that has been accomplished. Democrats, although outnumbered on the full council, have managed to exert substantial influence over the operation of the inner city through control of the budgets of various service districts. And

blacks, although not happy with the new system because of its avoidance of the resource redistribution issue, have fared better than previously in government appointments and public service positions and have captured a number of seats on the council largely because of the district election provision. (Prior to Unigov, city councilmen and county commissioners were elected at large).

Today, it is highly unlikely that any of the major groups in Indianapolis would seriously consider challenging Unigov's existence. Nor, on the other hand, would they be likely to make a serious effort to change the system in any material respect. Some civic groups, such as the League of Women Voters, initially felt that Unigov would evolve into a more complete consolidation; but thus far there has been no evidence of this occurring. The indications, in fact, have been to the contrary. In 1972, for example, the president of the city-county council called for the expansion of the Indianapolis police service district to cover the remainder of the consolidated city. The proposal quickly collapsed in the face of vigorous opposition from the outlying communities and from inner city Democrats who, as previously noted, were able to retain some measure of control over the Indianapolis police service district. During the last several years little talk has been heard of further consolidation, and the issue appears dead at least for the near future.

Some Unigov supporters also felt initially that the creation of a more centralized area-wide government should be balanced by the establishment

of community or neighborhood councils endowed with certain powers over matters of direct locality concern. With their backing a "minigov" bill was introduced at the same legislative session that adopted city-county consolidation. Opposed by the overwhelming majority of the latter's supporters who felt it would confuse and even jeopardize the Unigov measure, the bill failed of passage. It was again introduced in the next session of the General Assembly and a scaled-down version of it was enacted in 1972. The act mandated Unigov to prepare and adopt a plan dividing the area of the consolidated city into communities having a population of 5000 or more. Each of these subdivisions was then to conduct a referendum to determine whether the residents wished to organize a community council. According to the legislation the powers such a body could exercise were only those that would be authorized by the city-county council. Instead of adopting such a plan as directed by law, 28 of the 29 council members signed a petition requesting the General Assembly to repeal the Minigov act. Most of them were apparently fearful that the neighborhood councils could become the foci of political opposition. Although the act was not repealed, the legislature watered it down with amendments to the point where no one is now supportive of it, and it remains inoperative with little prospect of revival.

Some of the neighborhood organizations were also skeptical of Minigov, viewing the proposed councils as a potential source of competition. Opinions

vary as to the strength of neighborhood groups in Indianapolis. City officials claim they are strong. (Mayor Lugar recognized their importance by establishing an Office of Neighborhood Services in his administration to maintain liaison with community organizations, an office that has been continued under the present mayor). Other local observers, however, paint a different picture. They say that only two or three viable neighborhood associations exist and that minority group neighborhoods in particular are poorly organized.

The School Desegregation Issue

The issue of school desegregation in Indianapolis is related both directly and indirectly to Unigov: directly because desegregation proponents have charged that the exclusion of schools from the Unigov proposal was a deliberate act to perpetuate racial segregation in the area; and indirectly because the new government with its area-wide constituency provides a potential structure for exercising political leadership in the resolution of the school issue. Almost from Unigov's inception, its existence and the question of racial segregation in the public schools have been legally enmeshed. Despite the charges, it is doubtful that Unigov drafters excluded the schools from the consolidation plan for racial motives. Political considerations more probably were the dominant factors since it is highly unlikely that any reorganization bill which encompassed the school systems could have been enacted. Only seven years

before a plan proposed by the Marion County School Reorganization Committee to include all schools in one district was dropped in the face of strong opposition. Ironically, the creation of Unigov has now raised the legal question of whether its existence contributes to racial segregation.

Shortly before Lugar's reorganization group began to meet, the Department of Justice (in May 1968), at the request of a group of black parents, filed suit in the federal district court charging the Indianapolis Public School system (IPS) with de jure segregation. The long and complicated history of this suit, which to date remains unresolved, has paralleled the entire life of Unigov and in some ways has overshadowed its existence. The district court found IPS guilty of de jure segregation but initially ordered only minor adjustments for immediate implementation. In doing so, it noted that complete desegregation within IPS boundaries would encourage "white flight" to the surrounding suburban districts and lead to resegregation. Because of the latter consequences, the court enlarged the scope of the litigation by directing the Justice Department to name the surrounding school districts and the State of Indiana as defendants in order to determine whether there was a legal basis for ordering the establishment of a metropolitan school system. The court raised the question of whether the legislature in creating Unigov had not itself contributed to racial segregation by consolidating other functions but excluding schools.

Subsequent to the above action, the district court ordered a metropolitan-wide solution involving not only the school districts within Marion County but also those in the adjacent counties of the SMSA. This decision was appealed to the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals which rejected the metropolitan solution, citing the Detroit decision (Milliken v. Bradley, 418 V.S. 717) in which the Supreme Court voided a cross-district integration plan. The court, however, directed the district judge to determine whether the establishment of Unigov without a like establishment of school district boundaries warranted an inter-district remedy within the consolidated city (had opponents of Unigov raised this legal specter at the time reorganization was being considered, the plan would probably have met a resounding defeat).

Acting upon the appellate tribunal's directive, the lower court, in August 1975, found an inter-district remedy warranted and ordered the transfer of 6500 black children to eight suburban systems in Marion County (Washington and Pike townships were excluded from the order because their black enrollment was already above 15 percent). As the basis for its decision, the court cited the fact that the suburban districts had consistently resisted the movement of black citizens into their territory, had ceased their opposition to the Unigov proposal only when the act creating it included a specific provision that the schools would not be involved, and had strongly resisted the erection of public housing projects outside IPS territory. (Although the Indianapolis Public Housing Authority had jurisdiction five miles beyond the central city limits, none of the eleven

projects it constructed were outside the old city boundaries. Many of them were on the periphery but still within IPS jurisdiction. Occupancy in the projects was over 98 percent black). The court also found that the state had failed in its duty to alleviate the segregated conditions existing in IPS. By "expressly eliminating the schools from consideration under Unigov", the court said, "the General Assembly has signaled its lack of concern with the whole problem and thus inhibited the desegregation within IPS".

This decision of the district court was appealed by the suburban districts and the State of Indiana. The IPS school board supported the inter-district solution but challenged that part of the decision which provides for the busing out of black children without a corresponding busing in of white students. In July 1976, the Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the decision of the lower court. On certiorari, however, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the judgment vacated and remanded the case to the Court of Appeals for further consideration in the light of Washington v. Davis (426 U.S. 229) and Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corporation (50 L. Ed. 2d 450). This is where the matter now rests. (Both of these decisions hold that the action of a public body is not unconstitutional solely because it results in a racially disproportionate impact; proof of intent to discriminate is also required. The Washington case involved a written personnel test utilized in police recruitment which a disproportionate number of minority group applicants

failed. Arlington Heights dealt with the refusal of the village to grant a zoning change to permit construction of a low income housing project. In upholding the refusal, the court stated that such action did not violate the equal protection clause just because it foreclosed an opportunity for blacks to move into an area where the minority group population is quite low).

The lengthy litigation reflects the deep controversy that the school issue has evoked in the Indianapolis community. Until very recently the IPS school board strongly resisted efforts to achieve integration within its own system. Despite pleas to the court for authority to draw up its own plan, its efforts to do so were half-hearted and wholly inadequate. At one point the district court judge took the matter out of the Board's hands and appointed two commissioners to draft an interim and a long range plan. The former, which called for minimum enrollment of 15 percent black in all of the elementary schools in the old city, has been largely achieved. The commissioners were dismissed after drawing up the interim plan when the court granted the school board's petition to be allowed to formulate the long range proposal. Efforts on the part of the board to do so proved unsuccessful.

Until 1976, the seven-member school board was dominated by conservatives. In that year a slate of seven candidates committed to desegregate the system was elected with the support of the Teachers Union, the Democratic party organization, and several black groups. (Elections to the school

board are formally non-partisan, but partisan politics play an important role in them). Under the peculiar arrangements for school board elections in Indianapolis, only four of the candidates took office in 1976; the remaining three will not assume their posts until 1978. (The seven members are elected at large but from five districts. Each district is entitled to at least one member and can have no more than two). The present board is thus badly split with the four newcomers constituting the majority and the three conservative holdovers the minority.

Under the control of the majority, the IPS board has announced its support of the integration decision (other than the one way busing) and has moved to draft a plan applicable to IPS itself. For this purpose it appointed a committee known as School/Community Action Team (SCAT). The committee recently presented to the board an options type plan that divides the IPS district into pyramid areas organized so that each contains a high school and a number of elementary schools, with program options available in each. SCAT and the board majority feel that any inter-district solution ordered by the court can be superimposed on this pyramid structure. The school superintendent is lukewarm toward the plan.

It is doubtful that the positive and more liberal attitude of the school board majority toward racial integration reflects the views of the majority of Indianapolis residents. Their election was probably aided by a negative vote against the "ins" precipitated by voter dissatisfaction with the educational system in general and the long controversy over the

integration issue in particular. There is no indication, moreover, that the majority has ties which reach into the upper echelon of community influentials. That it could mobilize the leadership necessary to resolve the school desegregation problem is therefore doubtful.

One group of importance in the school issue is the Coalition for Integrated Education. Formed several years ago to work for a peaceful solution to the problem, the coalition is made up of the more progressive organizations in the community including the Urban League, Inter-Religious Council for Human Equality, Anti-Defamation League, Church Federation of Greater Indianapolis, YWCA, and the League of Women Voters. It has sought to intervene in the school suit as a friend of the court, and it has been supportive of the decision calling for an inter-district solution. The coalition would undoubtedly be an important moderating force should tensions arise over the enforcement of an integration order. Fortunately, Indianapolis does not at this time appear to have a Louise Day Hicks or other potential demagogue waiting in the wings to play upon the fears and prejudices of the people. The school issue has dragged on in the courts for so many years that the public seems to have grown weary of it.

The top "establishment" group, and the possible key to a resolution of the school issue, is the Greater Indianapolis Progress Committee (GIPC). The committee is formally appointed by the Mayor and theoretically at least serves as an advisory group to him. GIPC consists of 150 members, most of whom are drawn from the top echelons of business and industry. It would

be the equivalent of Civic Progress in St. Louis except for the formal ties that it has with City Hall. Any action on the part of the Indianapolis business community in a matter such as the school question would probably come through this committee.

Up to the present, business, like the Mayor, has avoided involvement in the desegregation issue. Now there are signs that business leaders are becoming concerned over the long controversy and what they perceive as its adverse effects on the community: white flight to the outlying counties, declining tax base in the inner city, and deteriorating educational standards. The general feeling is that these conditions will continue to worsen so long as the school integration issue remains unresolved.

The first overt indication that business may be preparing to play a leadership role in the school situation took the form of a breakfast sponsored by GIPC on April 29, 1977, attended by more than 350 people. The theme for the meeting was innocuously titled "Public Education--The Neglected Business Asset", but the real purpose of the breakfast was to zero in on the school integration question and the role that business might play in its solution. Speakers from Boston and Dallas told how top echelon businessmen in those communities actively involved themselves in the school controversy. The Dallas speaker related how business leaders there had taken the initiative in creating an informal committee of 21 members: seven white businessmen, seven blacks, and seven chicanos. Meeting behind closed doors, the Dallas group hammered out a consensus on a desegregation

plan. After it was accepted by the court, the committee then worked to neutralize the opposition and win community support for its execution. Speakers from the Department of Justice and HEW emphasized the need for moderation and compromise in school integration efforts and indicated that the government is not likely to oppose desegregation plans agreed upon by community leaders with minority group participation, as in the Dallas case.

It is too early to tell how far, if at all, the Indianapolis business leadership will be willing to commit its energy and resources toward effecting a solution to the integration issue. That it is now testing the water seems evident. The same observation may be made with respect to the mayor. Whether he is ready to exercise political leadership in this matter also remains to be seen. At the breakfast meeting he stated that leadership must be mustered to foster a positive and constructive approach to meet the constitutional mandate of equal educational opportunity.

The feeling appears to be growing among community leaders in Indianapolis that serious efforts should be directed toward a negotiated settlement of the school question. From statements made at the breakfast and in the interviews, it is obvious that lines are out for this purpose. Some directions that the settlement might take are already being quietly talked about, such as the suburban school districts annexing the areas on their periphery which contain the public housing projects. Despite these indications, however, it is unlikely that any efforts, beyond exploring

the various possibilities, will be made to negotiate a settlement until after the appellate court renders its decision. If the court affirms its previous mandate for an inter-district solution (and this is not overruled by the Supreme Court), community leaders from both city and suburbs will be in a favorable position to work out a settlement. Should the court, on the other hand, rule against an inter-district remedy, the controversy will shift back to the district court and the IPS system where the ball game will have to be replayed. Most observers in Indianapolis hope that this situation will not arise.

LOUISVILLE

Louisville is the center of a five-county SMSA which includes Jefferson, Bullitt, and Oldham counties in Kentucky and Clark and Floyd counties in Indiana, just across the Ohio river. The total population of the metropolitan area is slightly less than 900,000, the bulk of which (79 percent) resides in Jefferson county. Louisville, the seat of Jefferson county, has a population of approximately 336,000 or 48 percent of the county total. This figure represents a loss of twenty percent since 1960 and almost seven percent or 25,750 residents since 1970. During this same period the county as a whole showed a gain of fifteen percent; however, since 1970 its growth has also slowed substantially, increasing by less than 2000 people over the past six years. The two adjacent counties in

Kentucky, Bullitt and Oldham, have experienced gains of over 25 percent since the last decennial census but they remain relatively small in size, with populations of 33,500 and 18,400 respectively. Growth has also taken place in Clark, one of the two counties in the Indiana portion of the SMSA (from 76,000 in 1970 to 83,000 in 1975), while the number of residents in the other, Floyd, has remained stable (at about 56,000).

Almost 90 percent of the SMSA's 100,000 black residents live within the city of Louisville, the majority of them concentrated in the west end where the housing is the poorest in the area. In 1970 they constituted 24 percent of the city's population; by 1976 this proportion had increased to 28 percent. After showing a gain of 23 percent in the central city during the decade of the 1960's, the rate of increase of the black population has dropped sharply in recent years, reflecting for the most part a reduction on in-migration. The number of white residents within the city has continued to decline, with the loss from 1970 to 1976 being more than 35,000.

The city of Louisville encompasses a land area of only 60 square miles, the county six times that amount. Large scale redevelopment has taken place in the downtown area, including a new convention center, several new office buildings and motels, and a six-block long mall. As is true in many other SMSAs, the city has been adversely affected by the movement of large retail and industrial firms to the suburbs and by a declining tax base. In 1970 the median family income within the central city was

$8560 while in Jefferson County as a whole it was $9813. Calculated by race, the median family income for whites in the county was $10,267 and for blacks $6307. Twenty-nine percent of the black families (compared to thirteen percent of all families) had incomes below the poverty level.

About forty percent of the labor force in the Louisville area is employed in blue collar occupations. Nationally-owned plants such as General Electric, Ford, and International Harvester, dominate the employment pattern. Machinery, fabricated metal products, and transportation equipment head the durable goods sector while tobacco, whiskey, and chemicals are most prominent in the non-durable category. Louisville is the world's largest tobacco manufacturing center and one of the largest producers of whiskey in the United States. Unemployment in the area has been slightly below the national average while the average weekly wage for production workers ($234 in 1976) is above the national average of $206

The Governmental System

The governmental pattern in Jefferson county is made up of the county government itself, 75 municipalities, 22 joint city-county commissions and agencies, and numerous special purpose districts, including 19 fire protection districts. All of the municipalities except the city of Louisville are small in size, ranging from 200 to 18, 000 residents.

Few of them offer a wide spectrum of services. County residents living outside Louisville and three other cities must rely on private haulers for collecting their garbage and refuse. All of Jefferson county and part of the adjacent counties must depend for their water supply on the utility owned and operated by the central city, and for their sewage disposal on a metropolitan sewer district. Only the city of Louisville and a few of the larger suburban municipalities have their own police force; the rest of the county, including the incorporated areas, is served by the county police department. Even in the four suburban municipalities which maintain separate police departments, much of the criminal investigative work is done by the county. Fire protection in all of the county except Louisville and three other municipalities is furnished by fire districts with unpaid volunteers.

Land use planning, zoning, and subdivision administration are the responsibilities of the Louisville and Jefferson County Planning Commission, the members of which are appointed by the "county judge" (the county's elected chief executive) and Louisville mayor. The commission has final authority over the approval of subdivision applications and advisory powers with respect to zoning. Final authority over zoning in all sections of the county except Louisville and four of the larger municipalities rests with the county government. Both the city of Louisville and Jefferson county have created housing authorities, with the latter functioning in the unincorporated areas. The city operates twelve projects with a total

of slightly over 6000 housing units; the county authority has 270 low income units, the majority of them for the elderly.

Although there has been no major reorganization of local government in the Louisville area, a large number of urban-type functions have been consolidated over the years and are presently administered on a county-wide basis. These include mass transportation, sewage disposal, parks and recreation, public health and hospitals, airports, harbor, and air pollution control. What distinguishes the Louisville system from that in most other areas where functional consolidation has taken place is the arrangement under which these services are administered. In virtually all cases the individual function is the responsibility of a semi-autonomous city-county commission or authority appointed jointly by the mayor of Louisville and the Jefferson county judge. Thus while a substantial degree of functional consolidation has taken place, neither the county nor city government has effective administrative and policy-making control over the separately managed activities of these bodies. The county judge is particularly critical of this lack of unified direction and public accountability.

The city of Louisville is governed by a mayor and a 12 member board of aldermen, all elected on partisan ballots. The mayor serves for four years, the aldermen for two. The latter must live in the ward they represent but they are elected at large; the former cannot succeed himself. At the present time the mayor and all the aldermen are Democrats. The county

government is headed by a county judge (soon to be officially called county judge-executive), who serves as the chief administrative officer as well as head of the county courts, and by three commissioners. The county judge is elected for a four year term by the voters of the entire county. Commissioners are nominated in primary elections by voters of the district in which they reside but elected at large for four year terms.

The county judge and the three commissioners constitute the Fiscal Court, which serves as the administrative and legislative arm of the county. As in the city, all four members of the present body are Democrats. The county judge presides over the Fiscal Court with a full vote on matters coming before it. He appoints the chief of the Jefferson County police department, judges of the various divisions of the county court (which has jurisdiction over minor criminal and civil cases), and all of the county representatives on the joint city-county boards and commissions. The county government also has a complement of other elected offices including the sheriff, (whose duties consist mainly of collecting property taxes and serving process), county attorney, clerk, constable, coroner, and property valuation administrator (assessor).

The offices of county judge and Louisville mayor are positions of natural rivalry. However, with both holding equal appointing powers over most of the key area-wide boards and commissions, it is difficult for either to gain a tactical advantage in winning recognition as the top politico of the area. Should these functions be placed within a

reorganized county government structure, the position of the county executive would be greatly enhanced. The holders of both offices at the present time are young, vigorous, and politically ambitious. The mayor is handicapped in the rivalry that exists between the two by the legal provision which bars the city's chief executive from succeeding himself. The status of the county judge received a boost in 1972 when the General Assembly granted counties additional power to levy taxes and pass laws relating to matters that previously required action by the state legislature. It was diminished, however, by a recent change in law that divests him of his judicial responsibilities and control over the county court. Some observers feel that the interest of the present incumbent in promoting local government reorganization is motivated by the desire to compensate for this loss of judicial powers by increasing the executive and administrative authority of the office.

Two major efforts have been made in recent decades to reorganize the local governmental system in the Louisville area. The first occurred in 1956 when a plan to merge the city of Louisville with the surrounding urban areas in the county was submitted to the voters. The proposal carried inside the central city but was rejected by suburban voters. The second attempt was made in 1970 when a task force headed by Thruston Morton and Wilson Wyatt recommended an expansion of the Louisville city limits to include all the unincorporated areas of Jefferson county. The task force, however, was unsuccessful in its efforts to secure enabling

legislation that would permit the creation of a special commission to plan the expansion. Observers attributed this failure mainly to divisiveness over the issue within the Louisville-Jefferson county legislative delegation.

The question of governmental reorganization is again being raised, influenced in part by the example of the successful merger of Lexington and Fayette County, Kentucky, just 100 miles east of Louisville. Unlike the previous attempts where the initiative for change came almost wholly from the Louisville Chamber of Commerce and various other civic and good government groups, the current impetus is coming from several quarters, political as well as non-political. On the non-political side, the two metropolitan newspapers, Louisville Courier Journal and Louisville Times, have editorially called for a strengthening of the present system, and the League of Women Voters has endorsed reorganization in principle and instituted a study of what form it should take. The local Chamber of Commerce has also indicated that government reorganization is high on its list of priorities. These, of course, are the traditional sources of reform support. They are accompanied in the present instance by strong indications of political interest. The Kentucky House of Representatives, for example, has put the question of governmental reorganization in Jefferson County on its agenda for the 1978 session. Of even greater importance, the county judge, Todd Hollenbach, has assumed a leadership role in bringing the issue to public attention.

For well over a year Hollenbach in public statements has stressed the need for overhauling the county's governmental structure and bringing about a greater coordination and unified direction of city-county functions. He has not been specific, however, as to what type of reorganization he favors. Initially he spoke of merging the governments of the county into one unit under a strong executive but he soon dropped further reference to this remedy when the suburban governments expressed their strong opposition. He has also spoken of a piecemeal approach in which functions now administered by joint city-county commissions would be brought under direct county control. During the current campaign in which he is running for reelection, he has emphasized the need for reorganization but has not indicated what type of plan he favors, saying only that the various alternatives are being studied by his aides. Hollenbach obviously sees local government reorganization as a viable political issue that can enhance his status locally and statewide. Once the election is over, and assuming he wins as the odds would indicate, he is likely to place the issue high on his agenda.

Although the attention of Louisville and Jefferson County residents during the past two years has been directed primarily toward the school busing issue, there are some signs of receptivity among them toward governmental reorganization. A survey conducted by the Urban Studies Center at the University of Louisville in Februa[illegible] of this year (1977) found that two of every three respondents felt the government of the area

should be reorganized. One-third of them favored complete merger and another one-fourth chose "something in-between centralization and what presently exists". About one-fifth indicated a preference for decentralizing many of the functions to neighborhoods or areas while only fourteen percent said they would "leave everything as it presently is". These responses give no clear indication of the type of change that would be most likely to win wide acceptance. It is probably for this reason that Hollenbach is cautious about committing himself at present to any one approach.

The Educational System and School Desegregation

Prior to July 1, 1975, three separate school districts existed in Jefferson County: Anchorage, a small independent district of affluent suburbanites located in the outer reaches of the county; Louisville, which included most but not all of the area inside the central city limits; and Jefferson County which covered the remainder of the county. By order of the State Board of Education, the Louisville and Jefferson county districts were merged, effective as of that date, thus creating a county-wide system (excluding Anchorage) with almost 130,000 students. The system is now known as the Jefferson County School District. The events leading up to the merger are important to an understanding of the Louisville situation.

Under Kentucky law, the county is the basic educational unit in the state. Separate school districts may exist within a county when they meet

state requirements, as in the case of the Louisville and Anchorage systems, but they are exceptions to the common pattern. Because of the long tradition of unified county systems in Kentucky, sentiments for merging the Louisville and Jefferson county districts were frequently expressed. Louisville newspapers in particular called for such a merger, and for more than 25 years intermittent consolidation talks had taken place between the two districts. In 1966, a team of university specialists proposed that the two systems be broken up into several semi-independent local community school districts with their own boards but operating under the umbrella of a metropolitan education district. Although the boards of both the Louisville and Jefferson county systems voted unanimously to implement this pattern no further action was taken on the proposal.

As the issue of school integration became more prominent in the light of court decisions and pressure from HEW, the Kentucky Civil Liberties Union (KCLU) and the NAACP filed suit in the federal district court asking for desegregation of the Louisville system through annexation of all the area inside the city limits but outside the current city school district boundaries. Inclusion of this territory would bring some 15,000 white students into the Louisville district and thereby enhance the possibility of working out an acceptable desegregation plan. Black enrollment in the city schools at the time was slightly over fifty percent of the total; if the annexation was accomplished this proportion would be reduced to 37 percent. Regarding this solution as insufficient, the

Kentucky Commission on Human Rights filed an intervenor suit, asking that desegregation be achieved through merger of the three districts in the county.

In March, 1973, the district court judge, James F. Gordon dismissed the suits against the Louisville and Jefferson County school districts, ruling that both systems were sufficiently integrated to meet the constitutional requirements. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit in Cincinnati overruled the district court and ordered a desegregation plan prepared for the three districts. Pursuant to this order, Judge Gordon, in July 1974, declared the Louisville and Jefferson County systems merged and adopted a plan calling for the busing of more than 30,000 students. Two days later, the judge vacated his order when the U.S. Supreme Court remanded the case back to the Sixth Circuit in view of the Detroit ruling on cross-district remedies.

While these legal proceedings were taking place, the Louisville system found itself increasingly in financial straits. It was also concerned that the desegregation plan finally adopted by the court would be limited to the city district. Faced with these difficulties and uncertainties, the Louisville school board took advantage of Kentucky law which, in effect, permits an independent school district to dissolve itself and become part of the county system. In February and again in November 1974 the board passed resolutions requesting merger with the county district. When the latter continued to respond unfavorably, the

city district appealed to the State Board of Education which ordered the merger, effective July 1, 1975.

Consolidation of the two systems eliminated the legal question of inter-district solutions. As a consequence, the Court of Appeals in July 1975 issued a writ of mandamus directing the merged Jefferson County district to implement a full-scale desegregation plan by the opening of school in September of that year. (Ironically, Anchorage was excluded from the order on the basis of the Detroit decision). This action caught school officials wholly unprepared since they had assumed (and had received indications from the district court judge) that they would be given until the 1976-77 school year to implement whatever desegregation plan was ordered. Louisville thus found itself confronted with two major and controversial tasks that had to be accomplished within a matter of several months: effecting consolidation of the two systems and implementing the desegregation plan ordered by the court.

The plan adopted by Judge Gordon pursuant to the appellate court's mandate specified that every elementary school in the consolidated district have no less than twelve percent and no more than forty percent black enrollment, with corresponding ratios of 12.5 percent and 35 percent in the secondary schools. In addition, no less than eighteen percent of the faculty in any school was to be black. To achieve the racial balance specified, the plan provided for the busing of approximately 23,000 students. Because of the short time span for working out the details,

many pupils did not learn of their school assignments until a few days before classes began. For the same reason teachers and principals were not advised of their transfers until almost opening day of school.

Opposition to the desegregation order quickly surfaced. Louisville, which had prided itself on its race relations, became the scene of widespread violence as angry white demonstrators numbering in the thousands confronted police during the opening week of school, blocking major thoroughfares, smashing store windows, setting fire to school buses, and threatening black children as they were transported to the schools. Virtually all of the violence took place in the suburbs, since it was into these virtually all-white areas that large numbers of black students were bused. The county police department found itself at times unable to contain the violence. In contrast to the city police force which had begun contingency planning for possible riots as early as January 1975, the county department was quite unprepared, both in equipment and training, for the difficult task it faced.

The busing order precipitated the formation of a rash of opposition groups, most of them organized by individuals, such as housewives, blue collar workers, and dissidents seeking a cause, who were assuming leadership roles for the first time. The most effective of these groups was Union Labor Against Busing (ULAB) which had the backing and financial support of many white rank-and-file workers in the area's industrial plants. Other opposition groups bore such names as United Mothers Against Tyranny,

Stop Tyranny and Busing (STAB), Citizens Against Busing, Concerned Parents, and Christian Posse Comitatus, a para-military organization that engaged in firearm training and violence provoking activities. These groups initially enjoyed considerable success in mobilizing white citizens for protest marches and demonstrations, and in organizing boycotts against the schools and merchants who were not sufficiently outspoken in their condemnation of busing. They proved, however, to have little sustaining power, and today few of them are active. Rivalry among their leaders, differences over strategies and tactics, and the competition among them for members soon led to their decline. A few of the leaders spawned by the anti-busing movement have sought to use the issue as a springboard to political office but with little success.

Community leadership to ease tensions and bring about peaceful acceptance of the desegregation mandate left much to be desired. The two metropolitan newspapers did condemn the violence, taking the position that the law must be upheld regardless of one's views about busing (this stand caused over 5000 readers to drop their subscriptions). The Catholic church indicated that its schools would not be a refuge for those opposing the court's order. The Louisville mayor, who previously had not involved himself in the school issue also called for peaceful compliance with the court order. The county judge, who prior to the violence had taken no part in seeking a resolution of the school question or in preparing the community for desegregation, began to play a more assertive leadership

role. Following the demonstrations, the latter indicated his support of school desegregation but his opposition to busing. He also sponsored a conference of nationally-known experts in desegregation matters, such as James Coleman and Milton Glazer, to discuss ways of solving the problem. In early 1976 he submitted an alternative plan to the district court (Judge Gordon had given him the right to intervene) that relied mainly on voluntary student transfers. The Louisville Courier Journal referred to it as a political document, one that no court could take seriously. Judge Gordon apparently felt the same way because he rejected the plan and dismissed the county judge as an intervenor.

Leadership from the business community was conspicuously absent during the period of crisis. It was not until three months after the 1975-76 school year opened that the Chamber of Commerce, obviously alarmed at the adverse economic effects and the racist image created by the militant opposition to desegregation, issued a statement opposing court-ordered busing. In explanation, the Chamber stated that its action was to show support for anti-busing and to curb the efforts by frustrated anti-busing supporters to disrupt the economic, civic, and educational life of the community. It urged all citizens to cease threats of economic boycotts, retaliation against civic charities, and the intimidation of students or school personnel. It promised to work toward finding an alternative to busing, a promise that has not materialized.

The school issue has at no time been able to engage significantly the major power centers of the community in its resolution. When the crisis arose, it was groups lower in the Louisville structure that sought to defuse the violence and ease tensions. One such group was the Task Force for Peaceful Desegregation, a coalition of some 40 established community organizations such as the League of Women Voters, Urban League, and Church Federation. It set as its announced goal the peaceful desegregation of the school system in conformance with orders of the court. The Task Force maintained a "hot line" and manned a "rumor control center". Initially the Chamber of Commerce was a member of the group but after the first public statement was issued urging compliance with the court mandate, a statement that precipitated boycott threats against merchants, it withdrew from further participation. There was also a pro-bus organization, Progress in Education (PIE) which sought to elicit support for the desegregation plan. These various groups, however, had only minimal impact and their efforts did little to stem the violence until it had run its course.

The Jefferson County school district has now experienced two years of operation under the consolidated system and the busing mandate. Last September (1976) the schools opened with few incidents. Several of the opposition groups sought to organize protest marches and boycotts but with little success. The legal battle, however, is still continuing. Attorneys for the school board have petitioned the Supreme Court to review

the action of the Court of Appeals in upholding the plan ordered by Judge Gordon. They no longer dispute the legality of a desegregation plan for Jefferson county schools but argue that the present mandate goes too far in requiring massive busing.

A recent article in Saturday Review (April 30, 1977), entitled "What Louisville Has Taught Us About Busing", asserts that Louisville provides a lesson in how even the most disruptive form of busing can produce better results than anyone dared predict. This appraisal, however, may be too optimistic for what those "better" results are is not yet clear to local observers. Although the militant groups have largely disintegrated and most anti-busing leaders are now convinced that opposition efforts must follow legal and political channels, the busing issue continues to overshadow all other educational matters and directly affects their resolution. To cite one example, a public hearing held only recently (May 11, 1977) by the school board to discuss tax proposals quickly turned into an anti-busing forum, with many of the speakers saying they would not support a new tax as long as there is busing.

There has been little change, moreover, in the attitude of the general citizen body toward busing. Surveys conducted by the Urban Studies Center at the University of Louisville in December 1975 and February 1977 show that most whites and a substantial portion of blacks continue to oppose busing. In the first survey, white respondents by a margin of eight to one indicated their strong opposition to busing for

racial balance. Blacks supported the desegregation efforts with two of every three favoring the busing plan as implemented. In the second survey conducted 14 months later the white margin remained the same but support among blacks decreased, with only one of every two favoring busing. One reason for this decline may be the fact that busing falls most heavily on the black children. Under the desegregation plan presently in effect, most black students will be bused for at least eight or nine of their school years while white pupils will be bused for no more than one or two years. It is interesting to note also that the high incidence of opposition to busing in both interviews was recorded among all socio-economic classes and all age groups.

The consolidation of the city and county school districts has also created problems related to the desegregation issue. The merger brought together two systems with divergent educational philosophies and differently trained personnel. That in the city was open, progressive, innovative, permissive, and urban oriented; that in the county was conservative, authoritarian, change-resistant, and rural oriented. The former recruited its faculty largely from urban universities; the latter from rural based institutions such as Western Kentucky. These differences particularly affect the black students who are being transported in large numbers to the former all-white county schools where teachers from the old county system predominate. Black pupils unaccustomed to the strict discipline imposed in the new setting or the new code of behavior expected of them

frequently find themselves the subject of disciplinary action. Although blacks make up only 23 percent of the enrollment, they account for almost eighty percent of the suspensions meted out over the last two years.

Neither the school board nor the school administration has been able to inspire public confidence. The more liberal factions in Louisville, as well as the anti-busers, continue to express dissatisfaction with the manner in which the system is run. Busing foes tend to vent their frustation on school officials even though they are in no way responsible for the desegregation plan. Liberals and progressives, on the other hand, are disenchanted with what they feel is the unwillingness of the board and superintendent to face up to the basic educational issues confronting the community. Many of them are indicating that they will support increased funds for the schools only if officials adopt a forward looking program and take decisive steps to implement it. They are particularly critical of the superintendent who comes out of the former county system and was hired from industry several years before the merger because of his expertise in financial matters.

At the time the districts were consolidated, the five members of each of the two boards were reconstituted as the new governing body. According to state law this number will fluctuate until 1978 when the size will be permanently fixed at seven (members are elected from districts on a non-partisan basis). The split between the more progressive members from the old city board and the conservative holdovers from the county

system has hampered policy development. The resulting factionalism together with the cautious stance of the superintendent and the problems associated with desegregation have given the board and the school administration a negative image in the public eye. They have, in effect, unwittingly alienated themselves from virtually all the important constituencies in the community. This situation is not wholly of their own making; it is due in part to factors beyond their control.

Not all signs, however, are negative. Busing has not precipitated the "white flight" that many felt inevitable. Enrollment in the consolidated system has declined somewhat--from 118,505 in 1975 to 113,737--but this is due more to factors such as the lower birth rate and the slowdown of in-migration from the rural areas than to an exodus of white families. The fact that Jefferson county has a unified school system has, of course, discouraged racially motivated flight since families would have to move outside the county to escape integrated schools. Some such movement has occurred but it appears to be relatively minor. Officials in the adjacent counties say that the growth they are experiencing is due to other factors and would have occurred even if the desegregation issue had not arisen in Jefferson County.

Another encouraging sign is the opening of lines of communication among divergent factions in the community. One of the most interesting developments in this regard is the formation of a grassroots group called the Committee for Educational Excellence. The alliance grew out of a closed door meeting

held shortly before the opening of school in 1976. The major participants were Robert DePrez, a blue collar worker and leader of a militant anti-busing group known as the National Organization to Preserve and Restore Our Freedom, and Lynn Johnson, the head of the local NAACP. The meeting was arranged through the mayor's office on DePrez's initiative, with an officer of the Council of Jewish Women acting as a catalyst. The statement which emanated from the meeting pointed to the fact that the drafters were concerned with the safety of the children, now that a new school year was about to start. It went on to say: "We recognize that there are differences of opinion about how to provide the best possible education for our children. We have met today to try to begin to resolve our differences and to work to find a peaceful means to achieve the best education". The statement was subsequently endorsed by more than 40 groups representing a wide spectrum of views and positions. DePrez came under fire from the more radical anti-busers who called him a traitor to the cause and a tool of the Jews.

If the Supreme Court declines to hear the pending appeal on the desegregation plan, present arrangements for busing will probably continue without major change. Local observers hope that once the legal situation is settled and all avenues of appeal exhausted, the busing issue will gradually lose its salience for Louisville and Jefferson county residents. Until this occurs, the community will be badly handicapped in coping with its educational needs.

NASHVILLE

Nashville, the country music capital of the world, is now the nation's 30th largest municipality, the result of merging the city and county in 1962. Part of an eight-county SMSA of 740,000 people, the 533 square mile area under the jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County (Metro) contains approximately 460,000 residents (as of 1975). Its growth in recent decades has been substantial. From 1950 to 1960 its population increased by almost one-fourth, and during the 1960s by 12 percent. Since then expansion has continued but at a decreased rate--2.6 percent through 1975. The gains have taken place largely in the suburban portions while the inner city itself has suffered a decline in the number of residents.

Rapid growth has also occurred in the other seven counties of the SMSA, all of which are contiguous to Davidson--Cheatham, Dickson, Robertson,

Rutherford, Williamson, Sumner, and Wilson, the first five of which were added to the SMSA in 1973. Sumner, for example, increased by over 50 percent and Wilson by more than one-third during the last decennial period. These counties, which range in size from 14,000 to slightly over 60,000 residents, are growing at a faster pace than Nashville. Some observers attribute their continued rapid expansion to "white flight" caused by the school integration issue; but planners tend to discount this factor and to point to other variables such as cheaper land and lower tax rates in the outlying counties, the attractiveness of several large lakes, and the new interstate highways that facilitate access to the perimeters of the metropolitan area.

The black residents of Nashville number about 90,000, the majority of whom live within the boundaries of the old city. Prior to the merger, they constituted 38 percent of the city's total population; in the enlarged entity this proportion has been reduced to 20 percent. The income of Nashville residents is above the national average but, typical of the Southern pattern, the differential between blacks and whites is especially large. The median family income for the former in 1970 was $5,797 while that of the latter was $10,180. Compared to less than 10 percent of white households in Nashville, 28 percent of the black families had incomes below the poverty level.

Nashville's economic base is highly diversified. The manufacture of

non-durable goods--textiles, chemicals, printing and publishing--constitutes the largest sector, but since World War II the economic mix has shifted toward more durable goods, particularly metals, machinery, and transportation equipment. Nashville is an important financial center; its Union Street is sometimes referred to as the "Wall Street of the Central South." Four of Tennessee's five largest banking institutions are located in the city along with 14 insurance companies, the largest being National Life and Accident with assets of over $2.5 billion. Because it is the state capital, the city has an above-average proportion of its work force employed in the public sector (16%). The tourist trade has assumed greater importance to the local economy during the past decade or so, with the Opryland complex (involving an investment of over $100,000,000) being the major attraction. Nashville has also developed into one of the major recording centers in the United States; at the present time 57 recording studios operate within its boundaries.

Aided by several urban renewal projects and private investment, the downtown section of Nashville has undergone substantial face-lifting in recent years. A number of new office buildings and a 28-story Hyatt-Regency hotel have been completed and several projects, including a cultural arts center and a four-block mall are presently under construction. The downtown is spread out over a fairly large area, with the new buildings interspersed among the old structures and the parking lots. The architecture

of the new buildings, with one or two exceptions, is not particularly distinctive (the old churches are more interesting), and good restaurants are conspicuous by their absence.

Governmental Reorganization

In June 1962, voters of the city of Nashville and the remainder of Davidson county approved, by separate majorities, the creation of the Metro Government of Nashville and Davidson County, called by some political observers the most successful example of city-county consolidation in the United States in this century. The favorable vote marked the culmination of a long series of efforts to achieve governmental reorganization in the Nashville area. The first serious move in this direction took place in the early 1950s when the accelerated pace of urbanization that followed the war brought with it the familiar complement of service difficulties and developmental problems. At that time the city of Nashville was less than 30 square miles in territorial size and its population only 175,000. The new growth was taking place in the suburbs where the number of residents increased from 150,000 to more than 220,000 during the decade of the 1950s, while the city's population was declining by two percent. Dissatisfaction with the existing system among some area residents led to various studies and to a state constitutional amendment in 1953 that authorized the legislature to provide for city-county consolidation.

The early impetus for change came largely from civic and good government

groups. However, in 1955 the county judge, Beverly Briley, the county's chief administrative officer, called for the creation of a single areawide government. Up to this time none of the local political leaders, including the Nashville mayor, Ben West, had taken a public stand on merger. Briley was a highly respected public official who enjoyed good relations with the county electorate. As the then president of the Tennessee Association of County Officials, he was also in a strategic position to bring pressure on the state legislature to pass enabling legislation authorizing a metropolitan charter commission for the Nashville area. (Such a commission was created in 1957; it was composed of ten members, the county judge and mayor each appointing five.) The charter proposed by this body provided for the consolidation of the city and county governments. In the referendum that took place the following year, the proposal carried in the city but was defeated in the remainder of the county.

The 1958 consolidation effort had the full backing of Ben West, the Nashville mayor, and it was largely due to his active support and campaigning that the charter received a favorable vote within the city. An attorney by profession (as was Briley), West was a dynamic politician with a strong personality who dominated city government. During his tenure as chief executive, he was elected president of the American Municipal Association, and became widely known for his championing of urban causes. (He was one of the plaintiffs in the famous Baker v. Carr case which established the

the one-man one-vote principle for legislative reapportionment.) West felt confident that he could be elected metropolitan mayor if the charter passed. The only other potential candidate of sufficient strength to constitute a threat was Judge Briley. The latter, however, had been prevented from developing a political machine as strong as that of the central city mayor because of the limited powers of his office and the minimal patronage available to him.

The charter's loss in the county outside the central city was disappointing in view of the fact that the proposal had the backing of Briley. Some observers feel that the Judge, although publicly endorsing the reorganization, did not fully commit his political resources to the cause bacause of the fear that West might be elected the first mayor of the new enlarged government. Should this have occurred as seemed likely, West would have achieved the position of metropolitan political leadership that the two officials had been vying for over a period of several years.

Following the defeat of the consolidation proposal, the city took a series of steps that were deeply resented by suburban residents. Taking advantage of the strong annexation powers granted by the Tennessee legislature in 1955, Nashville annexed seven square miles of prime industrial land only two days after the metro referendum, and 42 square miles of residential area with over 82,000 residents some 18 months later. It also adopted a wheel tax of $10 to be paid by all car owners who used city streets for 30 days

or more each year. These actions revived the consolidation movement and led to the creation of a new charter commission in 1961. Eight of the ten appointees to the commission had served on the first body. The proposal submitted to the voters the next year was essentially the same as the one that had been rejected four years earlier.

In contrast to his vigorous support of the first merger effort, West now led the opposition forces. Once he had committed himself to expanding the boundaries of the central city by annexation, he could not go back and support Metro. Not only had he incurred the wrath of those suburbanites who had been brought into the central municipality against their will, but he had also aroused fear among fringe area residents that they too would be annexed by the "power hungry" city government. West's actions, in short, had destroyed whatever chances he may have had of becoming the chief executive of a merged city-county government. Briley's stock, on the other hand, had risen. He was able to exploit the antagonism stirred up by his central city counterpart and to play upon the resentment of many Davidson county residents toward the city's entrenched political machine. Virtually assured of the top post in the new government if the proposal carried, Briley committed himself and his political resources much more fully to the consolidation cause than he had in the first campaign.

Another unusual factor that aided the pro-metro forces was the school situation. Davidson county at that time was served by two public

school systems: the city and county. School board members in the former were appointed by the mayor and in the latter by the Quarterly County Court, the legislative arm of the county government. Each system received the identical per-pupil share of the county school tax. The city, however, provided its schools with additional funds from its own revenue sources, thus enabling the system to build better facilities and maintain a higher salary structure. Under these fiscal arrangements, county personnel had little hope of reaching the salary levels of their city counterparts except through a consolidation of tax revenues for the two systems. Such a situation would normally cause teachers and others in the advantaged system to look with disfavor on any plan that would spread educational resources over a larger base. In the case of Nashville, however, professional personnel in the city system had been alienated by the mayor's domination of the school board and his hand in firing a well-regarded superintendent who had resisted political encroachment on school affairs. As an outgrowth of these dissatisfactions, city and county educational forces joined in an unlikely alliance. They played an active role in the drafting of the charter and in supporting the referendum proposal that would merge the two school systems as well as the city and county governments.

Ironically for West, Metro was rejected in the pre-1960 boundaries of Nashville but the overwhelmingly favorable vote (actually an anti-West vote) in the newly annexed precincts delivered the city for the merger

proponents. Within the remainder of the county, the fringe adjacent to the enlarged city (where residents preferred a consolidated government to possible annexation) produced majorities large enough to overcome the rural opposition.

The charter of the Metropolitan Government of Nashville and Davidson County became effective April 1, 1963. It established a single government for the Davidson county area, replacing the old city and county governments. Six suburban municipalities, all of them small in size (their total population was less than 20,000) were permitted to retain their incorporated status and to function as before. They were barred, however, from any expansion of their boundaries within Davidson county.

Because of the differential service requirements of the urbanized and rural portions of the county, the charter provided for the establishment of two districts: the General Services District (GSD) covering the entire county, including the six suburban municipalities; and the Urban Services District (USD) encompassing the former city of Nashville. The metropolitan government may expand the USD by annexation as the need for urban services arises but it must provide such service one year after USD taxes go into effect. Each district has its own tax rate to pay for the services it receives.

The metropolitan government performs a broad range of functions in the GSD (county-wide) including police, courts, jails, assessment, health and

welfare, hospitals, streets and roads, libraries, public housing, building codes, airport, planning and zoning, refuse disposal, and schools. All Davidson county residents pay the GSD property tax levy which, at the present time, is $4.11 per $100 of assessed valuation. Residents in the USD receive additional services from Metro, including more intensive police protection, fire protection, water, sanitary and storm sewers, street lighting and cleaning, and refuse collection. For these services they presently pay an additional $1.89 per $100 assessed valuation, or a total tax rate of $6.

There are no special districts or independent authorities in Davidson county. The only governments are those of Metro and the six small suburban municipalities. Most residents outside the USD must rely on private haulers for garbage and refuse collection and on private departments for fire protection. The suburban municipalities supply some urban type services to their residents. Three of them have their own police force to supplement the protection given by Metro, one operates its own fire department, and two provide refuse collection. As this listing indicates, Metro is the provider of all local government services throughout Davidson county with the exception of those administered by suburban cities, private fire departments, private refuse haulers, and private sewer and water utilities.

Since the inception of the new government, the Urban Services District has been enlarged on several occasions until today it includes

28 percent of the county's total land area and 73 percent of its population. The first such annexation took place in December 1972 when 14.7 square miles, containing 14,500 people, were added; the most recent occured at the end of 1976 when three areas totalling 34 square miles and approximately 70,000 residents were included. Part of the long delay of ten years between the inception of the new government and the first expansion of the USD is attributable to the necessity of first extending urban services to the large area that had been annexed by the city just prior to consolidation. One of the major difficulties in this connection is associated with the extension of sewers. Because of Nashville's topography and subsoil strata, the installation of this facility in some areas is extremely costly.

Metro is governed by a popularly-elected mayor and a council of 40 members, 35 of whom are chosen by district and the remainder at large. A vice mayor, who serves as presiding officer of the council, is also elected on a county-wide basis. All elections are non-partisan and all terms are for four years. The mayor appoints the heads of the ten executive departments and, with council confirmation, all members of the 34 boards and commissions which are responsible for various functions such as parks and recreation, hospitals, libraries, and public housing (the Metropolitan Development and Housing Agency operates 19 projects with about 6000 dwelling units).

The consolidated government has become an established part of the Nashville scene. No one would seriously think of questioning its existence or returning to the old system. Much of the success in shaping Metro into an effective government and winning popular acceptance of it must be attributed to its first mayor, Beverly Briley. His stature among city, suburban, and rural residents was invaluable in convincing the electorate of the interdependence of the various sections of the county and the need for a decision-making process that could look at the interests of the area as a whole.

Attitude surveys show no signs of widespread hostility to the consolidated government, both blacks and whites indicating general satisfaction with it. Assessment of its accomplishments in more specific terms would be difficult and would depend largely on the sources one relies on for such an evaluation. Most observers seem to agree that Metro has improved the efficiency of the local governmental system, made its administration more professional, and brought about greater rationality in the area's physical development. Some, however, criticize it for what they regard as its lack of initiative in instituting social programs and promoting the interests of racial minorities and the poor. They say, for example, that Briley's fiscal conservatism and his emphasis on developing the administrative machinery of the new government caused him to move too slowly in expanding services and too hesitatingly in exercising leadership

in social programs. They also contend that Metro has not been sufficiently sensitive to the needs and concerns of its black population. Blacks originally opposed the consolidation fearing that it would dilute what little political strength they had. Whether they have fared better or worse under the new structure is a matter of debate. At the present time they hold six of the 40 Metro council posts and two of the nine school board seats. They have also made some gains in obtaining higher level positions in the administrative hierarchies of Metro and the school system, although with the current emphasis on equal employment opportunities they probably would have achieved similar results under the old structure as well.

Briley retired as mayor in 1975 after serving three terms (the limit provided in the charter). His successor is Richard Fulton, a young, attractive ex-state senator and ex-Congressman, who is spoken of as a potential gubernatorial candidate. Fulton is likely to be more aggressive than his predecessor in pushing Metro projects. Whereas Briley adhered to a policy of gradual expansion of services outward as fiscal conditions warranted, Fulton tends to move more rapidly whenever he perceives a need and the opportunity to meet it is available. The USD has already been enlarged by more than 36 square miles since he took office, and he is presently pushing for the extension of fire protection services throughout the county. He has committed himself to provide public capital improvements

in the downtown area with emphasis on parking facilities, sidewalk construction, pedestrianways, and street widening. In the area of human resources, he has stated that meeting the housing needs of low income families will be one of the major priorities of his administration. Thanks largely to Briley, Fulton has a supporting administrative organization that enjoys a good reputation among the citizenry. And as the head of an areawide government with strong powers, he has an advantage that few local chief executives enjoy.

The Educational System and Desegregation

Unlike the Louisville situation, opportunity was afforded in Nashville for the orderly transition to a metropolitan school system. The charter provided for a temporary Board of Education to assume control of both systems and work out the many policy and administrative problems that had to be solved before merger could be effected. The transitional board completed its work two years later, and on July 1, 1964 the new Metropolitan Board of Education took over control of all public schools in Davidson county. As specified in the charter, the board is composed of nine members, one from each of the nine geographical districts into which the county is divided for this purpose. They are appointed by the mayor and must be confirmed by a two-thirds vote of the entire Council. The members hold six year terms, with three expiring every two years. The annual budget adopted by the School Board is sent to the mayor for inclusion in the

Metropolitan budget. The mayor and council may cut the Board's budget request at their discretion. If they should do so, the School Board by a two-thirds vote of its members could call for a referendum to secure additional funds through an extra tax levy. (The schools are financed principally by a one and one-half percent sales tax, a property levy, and state aids, with each source accounting for approximately one-third of the budget).

Nashville schools have been confronted with the desegregation issue for more than 20 years. The initial action challenging the racial policies of the public schools was brought against the old Nashville city system in 1955 on the heels of Brown v. Board of Education holding that separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. (The original Nashville case is still on the Federal district court docket.) Two years later the school board presented its "grade-a-year" plan to the court, calling for desegregation of the first grade and an additional grade each year thereafter. The superintendent of schools rationalized the decision to begin at the first grade by saying the achievement level of white students in the system was superior to that of the black students.

The plan proposed by the Nashville school board was accepted by the district court and put into effect. In 1960 the court also ordered the county system to follow the grade-a-year plan and to desegregate the first four grades to catch up with the city schools. After merger of the two

systems in 1962, the Metropolitan County Board of Education continued to implement the court approved plan. Since the plan, however, was based on voluntary transfers, the amount of integration achieved was minimal at best.

Dissatisfied with the lack of progress in attaining the goal of integration, plaintiffs called upon the court in the late 1960s to order a more adequate plan. By this time two-thirds of the black students in Davidson county attended schools over 90 percent black, while 80 percent of the white children were in schools with enrollments of over 90 percent white. In August 1970 the District Court held that the school board had not met its affirmative duty to abolish the dual system. It directed the board to integrate teachers and other school personnel on an 80 to 20 basis in each school but did not require the integration of students. Implementation of the order was delayed pending an appeal to the 6th Circuit Court of Appeals. Four months later, the appellate body ruled that the School Board was not acting in good faith and ordered an immediate hearing to develop an adequate plan.

Following this ruling, the District Court judge requested the assistance of an HEW Desegregation Center to evaluate plans presented by plaintiffs and defendants in the case and, if necessary, to formulate its own plan. In June 1971 the court ordered immediate implementation of the plan prepared by the Desegregation Center. Under it, elementary schools

would have enrollments between 16 percent to 41 percent black, junior high schools 20 percent to 40 percent, and senior high schools 18 percent to 44 percent. (Blacks by this time constituted 25 percent of the system's total enrollment.) Some 33 schools at the outer edges of the county were excluded from the order because of their remoteness from the population centers and the time and expense involved in transporting students such a great distance. To achieve the ratios specified by the court would require the busing of an additional 15,000 students. It is important to note in this respect that Nashville and Davidson county had long used extensive busing as a normal part of their school system. At the time of the court order, over 33,000 pupils, mostly white, were already being transported for purposes other than racial integration.

The school board appealed the district court's mandate and requested a stay of the order pending the appeal. The Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the lower tribunal's ruling and said that any stay of the mandate must be sought for in the Supreme Court. (The latter subsequently refused to delay implementation of the plan and rejected the school board's appeal.) The carrying out of the integration order was compounded by the need to acquire additional buses. Until the fleet was enlarged, schools had to run on a staggered basis, thus causing considerable inconvenience to students and teachers. Obtaining additional buses, moreover, proved to be a difficult task. When considering the 1971 school budget, members of the

Metro council had demanded assurance from the board that no funds were included to purchase buses for the purpose of integration. The board cited this refusal in seeking a stay of the court's order, pleading that the school system's fiscal dependence on the Metro council prevented it from carrying out the busing mandate. Later, in August 1972, the district court directed that the mayor and council be made defendants in the case. Briley at that time vowed to "go to jail" rather than spend a half million dollars for new buses. The school board, however, on the advice of its counsel, voted to comply with the court order and purchase the needed equipment.

Nashville schools opened in September 1971, following the desegregation order, with little violence or disruption. Some picketing and boycotting occurred but lasted only a few days. During the period prior to the order several anti-busing organizations had come into being. The largest of these was Concerned Parents Association. A meeting of this group held shortly before the opening of school drew 2500 persons who roared their disapproval of busing and stridently denounced local officials, including school board members, for not being diligent enough in preventing it. Briley was told to "keep his word" and see that the schools remain closed until the Supreme Court acts in the matter. (Briley had requested the school board to delay the opening of classes pending determination by the Supreme Court of the stay request.) Even Senator Howard Baker came under fire

since it was on his strong recommendation that President Nixon had appointed the federal district judge who issued the Nashville busing order.

The opposition forces did not prove very effective in winning a large and militant constituency. One reason may have been the widespread extent to which busing was already being used. Another, and perhaps more important factor, was the degree to which Nashville had been prepared for the anticipated court order. As early as June 1971, when the court mandate seemed imminent, local groups and community leaders were calling upon the residents to remain calm and obey whatever ruling the judge might make. The Chamber of Commerce, in an official statement run in the newspapers, urged the citizens to see that the orderly operation of the schools be maintained; and the Metro council, although requesting the court to delay action, emphasized that no interference with the judicial process should be condoned.

On a more positive note, a spontaneously organized group of 500 Nashville residents, virtually all natives of the South, endorsed quality integrated education, using large advertisements in the metropolitan press to publicize their stand. The League of Women Voters similarly went on record in support of integration, as did United Parents for Quality Education. The last named group drew an audience of 400 at a meeting in which speakers from other cities told how they handled desegregation problems. Ministers across Nashville also joined together in calling for peaceful implementation and urging

parents to ignore the talk of boycotts and the shift to hastily assembled private schools. Newspapers ran a series of articles--and radio and television stations numerous programs--describing the preparations that were being made to facilitate implementation of the order. Informational meetings were held throughout the community by the school board and other groups and telephone "hot lines" were set up. Within the school system itself, the administration instituted a series of in-service training sessions to prepare teachers and other personnel for the change. Collectively, all of these efforts helped to calm the tension, if not allay the resentment, many Nashville residents felt toward the desegregation order.

Enrollment in the Nashville public school system peaked at about 96,000 in 1969-70 (blacks then constituted 24 percent of the total.) In 1971-72, the first year under the busing order, the number of white enrollees dropped over 8,000. Since then white enrollment has decreased each year (during 1976-77 it was 54,552 or approximately 18,000 less than in 1969-70). Black enrollment peaked in 1971 at 24,000 and has remained relatively stable since that time. Presently, blacks constitute 30 percent of the system's total enrollment of 78,000. The large loss of white students in the wake of the court order was undoubtedly due to the integration issue. The decrease in more recent years, however, is attributable mainly to the decline in the school age population, a phenomenon being experienced by most large school systems.

The "white flight" in Nashville to escape integrated education was less a geographical move than a switch to private schools or "academies" as many of them are called. There are approximately 50 such institutions now operating in the Nashville area. Excluding the Catholic schools, which comprise about one-fourth of the total and are of long standing, nearly one-half of the private schools have come into existence since 1969, most of them in obvious response to the integration issue. They bear such names as Donelson Christian School, Harding Academy, Pioneer Christian Academy, and Whispering Hills Christian Academy. A majority of them provide both elementary and secondary education. Tuition varies from $800 to $1500 per year, with the average in the $1000 to $1200 range. The total enrollment of all private school in 1976-77 was in excess of 16,000. Enrollment in the academies that were established since 1969 was almost 5,000.

The U.S. Commission on Civil Rights in a report on school desegregation issued in August 1976 gave the Nashville system a "moderate progress" rating. Such a rating, according to the Commission, is given to any public school district which has experienced minimal interracial violence in the schools since implementation of desegregation, has no evidence of significant increases in dropouts or absenteeism, is not currently involved in litigation concerning an adequate plan, and is considered by the NAACP, HEW, and state human rights organizations to have made moderate progress in desegregation. The report cited the fact that the actions and attitudes of civic and

religious leaders in Nashville created a positive atmosphere for integration while those of political leaders had a negative effect. The Commission was particularly critical of the Metropolitan council for its stubborn refusal to provide funds for additional buses. It also scored the school board for adopting a neutral position on the question of desegregation and doing no more than it had to in carrying out the order. Most knowledgeable observers in Nashville, while perhaps disagreeing with some of the specific criticisms, would concur with the Commission's appraisal of moderate progress.

There appears to be a considerable amount of dissatisfaction with the quality of public education on the part of middle and upper-middle class families. Those with sufficient means tend to send their children to private schools, not to escape integration but to obtain what they feel is a better education. The League of Women Voters, among other groups, is concerned with the relatively poor reputation that the public schools enjoy among Nashville residents. As the chairperson of its educational committee expressed it, the community tends to "bad mouth" the school system. To counteract this attitude, the League is presently engaged in an extensive public relations campaign, with Chamber of Commerce support, to raise the level of consciousness or awareness of the people toward their schools.

Some black leaders are also unhappy with the school system. A number of them contend that black children are not receiving an appropriate education in the integrated schools. They feel that teachers have low expectations

for black students and, as a consequence are too lenient with them and do not hold them to satisfactory levels of achievement. Others complain that racial minorities are made to bear most of the hardships of integration. As an example they cite a current dispute over the closing of a school in the inner city. (Lower enrollments in the Nashville system have created an excess capacity of space and necessitated the shutting down of some schools.) They point out that whenever a school is closed, it is invariably in a black neighborhood. Such a closing entails the busing out of black children rather than the busing in of white students from other parts of the area. "Why," they ask, "do blacks have to make all the sacrifices?"

The business community has demonstrated little leadership or involvement in the field of public education. Beyond calling for the peaceful acceptance of the court's mandate, it has played no role in the long series of events associated with school desegregation. Nor has it evidenced much concern with the question of educational quality other than lending some support, through the Chamber of Commerce, to the League of Women Voters' efforts to focus public attention on the issue. One reason for this lack of interest, some observers say, is the availability of the large number of private schools. The simple solution for the more affluent is to send their children to one of the better established private institutions. The existence of these schools, moreover, helps to offset whatever handicap a reputedly poor public educational system might impose on business in recruiting managerial and professional talent.

Desegregation through large-scale busing is now an established fact in Nashville. It is grudgingly accepted by most whites, but there is little consensus as to whether it has materially furthered the purported goals of a racially integrated educational system. The Nashville experience also demonstrates the difficulty of maintaining the prescribed racial mix in the face of constantly changing residential pattern. Some schools in the inner city are already becoming re-segregated as black families succeed whites in the adjacent areas. The school board is once again faced with the task of redrawing the zones on which the present busing plan is based in order to achieve a better racial balance in these schools. The inclination has been simply to close the re-segregated schools but this solution is no longer acceptable to the black community. Any change, of course, would have to meet the approval of the federal district court which still maintains jurisdiction over the implementation of its order. It has been a long haul for judicially-mandated desegregation of the public schools in Nashville and the story is still far from complete.

THREE CITIES IN PERSPECTIVE

The three urban areas that were the subject of our examination --Indianapolis, Louisville, and Nashville--have much in common. All are middle-size SMSAs located within several hundred miles of each other in contiguous midwestern and border states. Each has a diversified industrial and commercial base (dominated by national corporations) and an economy that is essentially healthy. Each has its internationally-known tourist attraction: Indianapolis its 500 mile Speedway race, Louisville its Kentucky Derby, and Nashville its Grand Ole Opry. Close cultural similarities exist among the cities, with each having a basically conservative population and attitudinal patterns that reflect a Southern influence.

All three areas have undergone significant governmental reorganization in recent years. Indianapolis has consolidated the central city and county governments but left the public school districts untouched; Louisville and Jefferson county have merged their educational systems but have made no basic changes in their local governmental structure; and Nashville and Davidson county have effected a consolidation of both their governmental systems and the public schools. Each of the areas, moreover, has been involved in long and costly litigation over the school desegregation issue. In the case of Indianapolis, the federal district court's most recent directive ordering the busing of inner city students to suburban districts has been stayed pending appeal. In Louisville, the lower court's mandate requiring large-scale busing is now being implemented although the school board has appealed the order contending that it involves too drastic a remedy. And in Nashville where extensive busing has been carried out for some time, no litigation questioning the basic features of the desegregation plan is now pending although the federal district court continues to maintain jurisdiction over the matter.

The following table is intended to provide a quick quantitative overview of several demographic and socio-economic characteristics that are relevant to our examination of the three municipalities. By way of comparison we have also included similar statistics on the city of St. Louis.

Selected Characteristics of Four Cities

Characteristics	Cities			
	Indianapolis Unigov	Louisville	Nash.-Dav.	St. Louis
Population (1975	714,878	336,000	446,941	547,000
Area (sq. mi./1970)	379	60	533	61
% Black (1970)	18	24	20	41
% Black Enrollment in public schools (1975)	45*	23**	30	71
Median Family Income (1969)	$ 10,751	$ 8,560	$ 9,469	$ 8,173
% Poverty Families (1969)	7	13	10	14

* Within Indianapolis Public School System (IPS)
** In consolidated city-county district

On the dimensions summarized above, St. Louis is more similar to Louisville where no reorganization of the local political system has occurred than it is to the other two communities where governmental consolidation has taken place. Like Louisville, and in contrast to the situation in Indianapolis and Nashville, the municipal government of St. Louis must operate within a much smaller territorial area, the median family income of the city's residents is lower, and the proportion of its poverty families is higher. How-

ever, unlike Louisville, which is an integral part of a county wide school district, the public educational system of St. Louis is confined to the city itself and therefore dependent on a much more circumscribed tax base. Moreover, the problem of racial segregation in St. Louis schools must be solved within these narrow territorial boundaries where the proportion of blacks is substantially higher than in the consolidated educational systems of Louisville and Nashville, and in Indianapolis where an interdistrict remedy order is awaiting action by the appellate court.

Conclusions

A number of conclusions or generalizations of possible application to a wider spectrum of urban areas have emerged from our limited study of the three communities. Some of these are merely reiterations of the conventional widsom on urban phenomena while others are of a more tentative nature and require testing in a broader sample of cities. We have summarized them here under three headings: governmental reorganization, public education, and community leadership.

Governmental Reorganization

G-1 Despite the many failures to achieve broad-scale reorganization in the nation's SMSAs, significant alterations in the local governmental system of many urban areas have been brought about over the past several decades.

The numerous defeats of well-publicized reorganization campaigns have obscured the fact that a substantial degree of governmental change has been taking place in many SMSAs across the country. Although these modifications

in structure and service responsibilities have been evolutionary or incremental in character, their effects have been cumulative. The systemic changes resulting from them have enabled a large number of urban areas to operate more effectively and efficiently in coping with metropolitan problems, particularly those of a service nature. Because the major thrust of these reorganizational efforts has been functional consolidation, usually at the county level, central cities have benefited to the extent that the costs of the merged services have been spread over a larger territorial area.

Support for this generalization can be found in both Indianapolis and Louisville and to a lesser extent in Nashville. Even before city-county consolidation in Indianapolis, a substantial number of services (including public health and hospitals, welfare, parks, airports, libraries, and mass transit) had been merged on an areawide basis. Unigov, in fact, was not created for the purpose of enlarging the number of county-wide functions but rather to bring those already consolidated (but operating under independent agencies and commissions) under centralized administration. In Louisville, also, such services as sewage disposal, parks and recreation, airports, public health and hospitals, and mass transit, had been merged on a county-wide basis over the years.

G-2 The government of the central county is emerging as the dominant political unit in many SMSAs.

This conclusion is complementary to the first since it is largely at the county level that functional consolidation has been taking place. The earlier trend of creating special districts or independent authorities to meet areawide needs has been supplanted to a great extent by the movement to vest such responsibilities in the county government. This shift is due partially to federal aid policies which discourage the establishment of special districts in favor of general governments. It has also been prompted by the strengthening and modernization of the administrative machinery of county government in many urban areas, and by the increasing resistance of local officials to independent service districts or authorities over which they have no voice or control.

G-3 The kind of informal relationships that exist between a state and its principal urban areas is one of the determinative factors of governmental change in such communities.

The governmental setting of an urban area lends itself more readily to modification in cases where the state, particularly the legislative body, has established a pattern of intervention in the affairs of the locality either as a stimulator of action or a mediator among local political interests. The likelihood of this occurring is substantially greater when the community is also the state capital. In such instances, members of the legislature from all parts of the state are exposed first-hand to the problems and needs of that area in which they must reside for a portion of each year. Under such

circumstances their receptivity to change is likely to be greater. The fact that both Indianapolis and Nashville are capital cities undoubtedly facilitated the passage of the Unigov Act in the case of the first and the necessary enabling legislation to create a Metropolitan charter commission in the second.

G-4 Broad-scale reorganization of local government in an urban area is unlikely to take place unless espoused and promoted by a key political figure in the metropolitan community.

This observation is merely a reiteration of a generally acknowledged fact. We call attention to it here because the Indianapolis and Nashville experiences provide graphic illustrations of its applicability. In Indianapolis it was an energetic and politically ambitious mayor who saw reorganization as a means of gaining national recognition; and in Nashville it was the administrative executive of the county government who saw in it the opportunity to become the major political figure of the area as head of a consolidated city-county government. Similarly, if the current talk of reorganization in Louisville should lead to successful action, it will be largely because the county executive perceives the issue as one to help further his gubernatorial aspirations. Initiative by a political leader is, of course, no assurance of success as illustrated by Nashville's first and abortive attempt at city-county merger led by the central city mayor. Other factors, such as public dissatisfaction, elite support, and a favorable political climate must be present in the right combination to make the time opportune for change.

Public Education

E-1 A racially-mixed community cannot seriously cope with the problems of quality education until it has first resolved the desegregation issue.

In all three of the cities that we examined the question of educational quality has been submerged in the long struggle to desegregate the schools. The attention and efforts of all the participants in the controversy--proponents, opposing groups, school board, school administrators, and courts--has been directed almost exclusively to this aspect of public education. Despite gestures and rhetorical references to quality education as the overriding goal, busing (to many urbanites a code word for racial integration of the schools) continues to dominate the local educational scene in the three cities. This statment is as true of Nashville and Louisville where court-mandated plans have been in operation for some time as it is of Indianapolis where the integration order has been stayed pending the outcome of the litigation.

Without strong public support, the efforts to improve educational quality will remain minimal; and such support is not likely to be forthcoming as long as the desegregation question remains dominant. The current Louisville situation provides a telling illustration of this dilemma. The efforts of the school board to secure additional operating funds has become almost inextricably enmeshed in the desegregation issue, with many residents and groups indicating their opposition to any new tax or increase in existing taxes until busing for purposes of racial integration ceases. The issue, moreover,

is not likely to disappear since constantly changing residential patterns require continual readjustments in any school integration plan based on busing. The Nashville experience, among others, shows that individual schools, particularly those in the inner city, can quickly become resegregated as the proportion of minority group enrollees in the system increases. As a consequence the desegregation issue is likely to be reignited each time a school is closed because of decreasing enrollment, or changes are made in the busing pattern to maintain the prescribed racial mix.

E-2 Dissatisfaction with the public school system and a lack of confidence in those who administer it are today common characteristics of many large and medium-size cities.

Repeated expressions of dissatisfaction with the public schools are heard in Indianapolis, Louisville, and Nashville. The school board and administration in each of the cities are criticized (for different reasons) by both blacks and whites, pro-integrationists and busing opponents, liberals and conservatives. The superintendents, in particular, are the targets of heavy censure emanating from two opposite poles. On the one hand they are criticized for their failure to develop innovative programs and improve educational quality and, on the other, for not sufficiently stressing educational basics and enforcing discipline.

The dissatisfaction of the general public with the schools in these cities appears to stem less from the belief that educational quality is inadequate

than from feelings of resentment (and fear) over the integration issue and mandated busing. Many urban residents have become alienated from their public school system. They tend to condemn the schools for being overly permissive and for kowtowing to the demands of blacks and civil libertarians. They charge the system with failure to educate the children, pointing to such commonly cited examples as those of high school students who are functional illiterates. Their real concern, however, is with racial mixing which they tend to believe, although they do not say so publicly, has caused the schools to deteriorate.

This description is by no means applicable to all critics of the schools in the three cities. A growing number of residents in each community, black as well as white, are deeply concerned with the kind or quality of education that their children are receiving. Some in this group believe that schooling appropriate to contemporary society can take place only in integrated settings. They blame school officials for failing to articulate the desegregation issue in terms of quality education and to act aggressively in designing strategies and programs to promote this goal. Others among them fear that the emphasis by civil rights organizations and the courts on school integration as defined numerically is counter-productive. They score school authorities for letting the issue consume an excessive amount of their attention to the neglect of improving educational quality.

These various views demonstrate the unenviable position in which school boards and administrators have been placed. However, part of the blame for

the relatively low public regard in which they are held must rest with the authorities themselves. Neither the school board nor superintendent in Indianapolis, Louisville, or Nashville merit commendation for their performance. Through the long period of the desegregation controversy, they demonstrated little initiative or leadership in seeking a meaningful solution to the problem or in creating a positive atmosphere in the community for its consideration. Instead they straddled the issue, resisted all efforts of the courts to design an adequate remedy, and sought to get by with the least change possible. When they did act, it was usually in response to the directives of the court. As the report of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights said of the Nashville school board, "it did no more than it had to in carrying out the court's order." Because of the essentially negative attitude of the school officials and their failure to act decisively, one way or the other, both pro and anti-integrationists along with the public in general have seemingly lost confidence in the ability of the boards and administrative hierarchy to operate the educational delivery system.

E-3 A school desegregation plan based on racial proportions can be made operational only within an area larger than the central city.

The existence of county-wide school districts in Louisville and Nashville made desegregation (in the sense of balancing the races in the schools in relative proportion to their numbers) possible. In Indianapolis, on the other hand, the multiplicity of school districts has proved a major impediment in

devising a plan that meets judicial guidelines. Because of the usual concentration of racial minorities within the central city of most urban areas, a desegregation plan based on numerical ratios results in high proportions of black students and other minorities in each school. When this situation occurs, it tends to precipitate a further withdrawal of white students and a resegregation of the central city public schools.

The Nashville and Louisville experiences demonstrate that massive busing to achieve a racial mix in the schools is workable where the suburbs are included in the plan. By extending the integration plan beyond the central city, the proportion of black students assigned to each school is small relative to whites. In Indianapolis, for example, almost half of the school population within the IPS district (former central city) is black. Were all of Marion county included in the plan, as the court order now being appealed specifies, black students would constitute only about 15 percent of the total enrollment. Similarly in Louisville, over 50 percent of the school population in the old central city district was black; in the consolidated system this proportion is less than 25 percent.

The fact that massive busing for the purpose of racial integration is taking place in Louisville and Nashville does not necessarily attest to the merits of such action from the standpoint of educational benefits. Nor does it mean that the residents of these areas are happy with this solution; actually most of them remain opposed to it. What it does mean is that the

county-wide solution, made possible by a single school district in each area has kept the proportion of black enrollees in the individual schools at a level below the "tipping point", thereby minimizing the outflow of white students. (In both cases, moreover, white students would either have to turn to the private schools or go outside the county to escape integrated schools). What it does mean also is that desegregation plans based on busing continue to be operational in Louisville and Nashville, and although they have created considerable disaffection they have to a certain extent become a grudgingly accepted fact of life.

E-4 An increasing number of blacks are evidencing more concern for the quality of education and less interest in the racial mix ordered by the courts.

Many blacks' parents, mainly middle-class, are beginning to question the quality of the education their children are receiving in the desegregated schools. While remaining committed to the principle of integration, they are asking whether the benefits are commensurate with the costs racial minorities must bear. Some of them believe that black children are receiving an inferior education in the desegregated schools. They feel that the continued resentment of whites over forced busing is reflected in the negative attitudes of many school administrators and teachers toward black students.

The present scenario, in short, is marked by considerable ambiguity. The courts have as their objective the desegregation of the public schools to comply with the Constitution. They do not deal with the goal of educational quality; their mandates emphasize numbers, the proportion of black students

to whites (probably because this is the only objective measure available to them). The majority of whites, whatever their personal predispositions, pay lip service to school integration as a desirable goal but maintain that it should be achieved by voluntary means. Blacks are divided in their views. Some place the major stress on forced integration and support massive busing plans for this purpose; others feel that quality education should be the overriding objective and desegregation secondary; and still others, now a small minority, continue to call for black control of their schools. White liberals find themselves uncertain as to what stand they should take because of these conflicting views among blacks. As a consequence their position is often ambivalent, with uncertainty as to which goal should be given priority seemingly increasing.

E-5 Courts are likely to approve desegregation plans that have been worked out by community leaders, including minority group representatives, even if such plans are not based on strict racial quotas in the schools.

The lower court in each of the three cities gave indications that it would be receptive to a plan which had the consensus of all the relevant parties. Similarly, Department of Justice and HEW officials have at times seemed to suggest that the government is not likely to oppose desegregation plans agreed upon by the major elements of the local community. Such a consensus, however, is extremely difficult to reach as the experience of the three cities demonstrates. In no case was it possible to arrive at a plan acceptable to all the parties. Indianapolis, however, is moving in this direction and a negotiated settlement of the issue is now within the realm of probability.

It may be that the most potentially fruitful course for resolving the desegregation problem (once the legal question of inter-district remedies is judicially clarified) lies in this direction. The courts are obviously not in a position to address themselves to the question of educational quality. With differences in goal priorities apparently increasing among those who are seeking to better the educational opportunities for poor and minority group children, negotiated settlements (monitored by the courts) may offer the most productive means of balancing the goals of racial integration and quality education. It is conceivable also, as indicated by the Indianapolis situation, that the long legal battle in many communities has made both the immediate participants and the public generally weary of the issue and more receptive to serious negotiation. Once a locality comes to a realization that it cannot escape desegregation, the prospects of arriving at a judicially acceptable plan are generally advanced.

Leadership

L-1 Solution of the school desegregation issue has been left, in the main, to the courts and to secondary and lower level groups in the community leadership structure.

The primary institutional force for school integration has, of course, been the federal courts. Without their active involvement, initiative, and direction, as well as the sanctions they have at their disposal, it is not likely that much desegregation would have occurred in the public school

systems of the country. Outside the courts and the promptings of federal agencies, the main initiative has come from the major black organizations and the civil rights groups, none of which reach up into the top echelons of community power.

As the long history of desegregation efforts in Indianapolis, Louisville, and Nashville demonstrates the issue has not been able to engage the major power centers of the community in its resolution. Only in Indianapolis are there currently signs that the key "establishment" group has become concerned to the point where it is considering involvement. By default, therefore, the task of preparing urban communities for desegregation of the schools and advancing plans to achieve this goal has fallen to the secondary and even tertiary leadership organizations. These groups lack the power and resources to mount the necessary initiative and to pressure the relevant institutional actors, such as the school board, into taking affirmative steps to meet the constitutional mandate.

The non-involvement by top community leadership, business as well as political, in educational matters affects more than the desegregation issue; it has a negative effect on public education generally. For so long as the "establishment" remains passive toward the educational system, efforts to raise the quality of the schools will continue to lack the elite support vital to the accomplishment of this goal.

L-2 The involvement of business leaders in public education may be conceptualized at two levels: technical assistance and issue resolution.

As we have already indicated, the upper stratum of business influentials has played virtually no role in public education for the last half century or longer. Business leaders have generally confined their involvement in this sphere to endorsement of bond issues for new facility construction and to occasional statements of a polite nature emphasizing the value and importance of the public schools. The fact that most of the business elite live in the wealthier suburbs where the educational system functions routinely (and many of them send their children to private institutions) contributes to the lack of active interest in the central city schools. The issue of educational quality does not seem to have generated any great concern among them, probably because they do not perceive it as having any significant impact on the operations of their business enterprises. They experience no great difficulty in finding the talent to fill the technical and administrative posts in the industrial and commercial world, while the routine nature of most of the other tasks does not require a superior education.

Recently, however, the business elite has begun to manifest some involvement with the schools. Aside from the more common work-study programs, this involvement has taken the form mainly of technical-type assistance in which business donates its management skills, helping, for example, to streamline the business and financial staff functions of a school system. Business feels comfortable in engaging in this kind of activity because of its noncontroversial nature, and school administrators welcome such assistance since

it does not encroach on their educational prerogatives. The article in the Wall Street Journal (May 9, 1977) outlining the St. Louis program of business aid received wide circulation among school officials and businessmen in Louisville and was commented upon favorable in the metropolitan press.

The second level of business participation goes beyond technical help to involvement in issues of substantive concern, such as desegregation and educational quality. Few examples of this stage of involvement can as yet be cited. In Indianapolis the business elite have been participating at the first level and are presently giving consideration to entering the second in order to facilitate a negotiated settlement of the desegregation issue. The Dallas example, referred to in the Indianapolis section, is one of the more prominent instances of second level involvement. There, business leaders took the initiative in creating an ad hoc committee of their own colleagues and minority group representatives to work out a desegregation plan.

This second level of activity has been avoided by the business elite mainly because of the controversy it inevitably involves. Until businessmen see a direct connection between the substantive educational issues and the well-being of their economic interests they are likely to remain on the sidelines. In Indianapolis the top leadership structure of the business community is beginning to perceive such a relationship, and hence is at least talking about intervention in the desegregation issue. Similar perceptions are likely to occur more frequently in urban areas as the cost of public education continues to spiral and dissatisfaction with its operations and outputs grows.

L-3 Like the business elite, local political leaders have tended to avoid involvement in school affairs and issues.

The traditional separation of the educational delivery system from the control of municipal government has discouraged local officials from intervening in school matters. To do so has often left them open to the charge of injecting politics into the educational system. In more recent years political leaders have shunned involvement more because of racial and other controversial issues confronting the schools and have used the separation principle as a convenient rationale for their non-participation.

Two developments are now causing a shift in attitude on the part of local political officials. One is the fact that elected officials in those communities which have experienced disorders have been thrust unwillingly into the center of the desegregation controversy. The involvement of the county judge (county executive) in Louisville is a case in point. He had taken no part in the school integration issue until his county police department was faced with the violence that erupted over the busing order. Convinced that the issue was one he could not avoid, he subsequently sought to intervene in the pending litigation and to push for a plan that he considered more acceptable to the majority community.

The second development causing local officials to reconsider their "hands off" stance is the realization that the fate of the city is closely tied to that of its school system. The fiscal plight of many of the nation's larger municipalities has dramatized the fact that the public educational

system consumes a substantial portion of the local public budget. Hard pressed municipal officials are becoming increasingly convinced that they must do more than complain about school expenditures; they must become more knowledgeable about educational affairs and be prepared to exercise leadership of a positive nature in this field. They are also concerned about the deleterious effect that the desegregation issue and the general disaffection with the public schools is having on their communities. These are factors that are impelling the mayor of Indianapolis, for example, to consider intervening in the long desegregation controversy in that city.

A Final Observation

Our survey of Indianapolis, Louisville, and Nashville underscores certain factors that are of interest to those concerned with the political and educational systems of the city of St. Louis. Most importantly, it points up dramatically the extremely disadvantageous position (from the standpoint of governmental structure) that St. Louis finds itself in relative to other municipalities of comparable size. Even aside from the major reorganizations that have taken place in Indianapolis and Nashville, all three cities were able to benefit from changes that evolved at the county level. First of all, the outward migration to suburbia of their more affluent residents and their industrial and commercial establishments, although damaging to their tax base, was not a total loss. As part of a county, they share in the public

resources of that entity. This sharing, moreover, has increased significantly during the last several decades because of the consolidation of a widening range of functions under county government, thus relieving the cities of responsibility for certain costly services such as public hospitals and parks. In contrast to the situation in these three municipalities, the city of St. Louis, as a governmental unit outside of and completely separate from St. Louis county, suffers an almost total lost financially when its residents and businesses move to the suburbs. Thus because of its peculiar constitutional status, it has been excluded from benefitting in the substantial growth in wealth and resources that has occurred outside its boundaries during the present century.

A second, although less tangible, handicap growing out of St. Louis city's legal position is its circumscribed leadership pool. The other three municipalities are able to benefit not only from the broadened service delivery system and tax base of the county within which they are located, but also from a leadership structure that extends beyond the central city. In both Louisville and Nashville, for example, the dominant local political figures to emerge in recent years were county officials. St. Louis, in contrast, must draw from a leadership pool that excludes the considerable talent of St. Louis county. This is a serious disability when added to the range of other problems common to most large central cities today. Among other disadvantages it excludes the possibility of an effective leader emerging as the political spokesman for the area vis-a-vis the state and national governments. The

absence of such leadership also creates a situation in which competition between the central city and the county for revenue sources and industry is far more intense and counter-productive than that which normally occurs when the municipality is part of the county.

The Louisville and Nashville cases show the advantages that a consolidated school system has in achieving desegregation and promoting greater equality in financing educational costs but they do not as yet evidence what advantages, if any, such a system has in raising the quality of education. Theoretically at least, a unified district has a far greater potential to move toward this latter goal by enlarging its leadership pool to include the whole county. The question is primarily academic, however, since the unique combination of circumstances that led to school merger in Louisville and Nashville is not likely to be repeated in many other urban communities. More relevant to the St. Louis situation is the clear message of the desegregation experiences in the three cities that public school systems are badly in need of the active involvement of top civic, business, and political leadership.

To repeat a popular cliche, there are no universal solutions to the structural and functional problems of urban areas. Each must fashion its governmental machinery to suit its own needs, customs, and political realities. The three communities that are the subject of this survey are plagued with the same type of problems as the city of St. Louis. They have, however, been able to make changes in their governmental system, some of them of a

significant nature, in efforts to cope more effectively with contemporary needs. St. Louis, on the other hand, has been denied this opportunity, the result largely of the 1876 constitutional heritage that separated the city from the county and fixed (in perpetuity one might almost say) its territorial boundaries.